Referendum proposes more politics and less governing
Say "No" to proportional representation
After every election, thoughtful and well-meaning analysts and political pundits write and talk earnestly about how a minority of the votes cast can give a political party a majority of the seats in the Ontario Legislature, or in the Parliament of Canada, and wonder if we could design a better system. The proposals floated by most analysts may make for better political theatre, but they all come at the cost of an unwieldy, indecisive, fractious, ineffective and costly government.
In October, Ontario voters will be asked to vote "Yes" or "No" on one such proposal: Mixed-Member Proportional Representation, or MMP. This proposal came about as the outcome of a process in which a random selection of people, none of whom had ever sat in government, looked at various systems by which elected representatives might be chosen. No elected MPP had any input into these discussions. As was the case in other such consultations, these people chose a system that seemed to offer some benefits, but in fact permanently transfers the balance of power with the Ontario Legislature to an unelected, unaccountable (and worse) undefeatable rump of splinter groups.
For all its perceived demerits, the first-past-the-post system is stunningly simple, and actually confers upon a government a mandate - and an obligation - to do something. We do not elect governments to give every organized splinter group a voice. We elect them to focus the resources of the province or nation and accomplish something!
To offer the reward of a legislature seat for every organized faction that can muster the necessary resources, register as a party, and perhaps achieve an arbitrary fraction of the local or popular vote will mean the proliferation of single- or special-interest parties, many (or most) of which will actually get a voice in the Ontario Legislature if Ontarians vote "Yes" in the referendum that will be on the balot during the October election.
This fractioning of Ontario's Legislature, its decision-making body, is not the intent of the MMP system advocated by the Citizens Assembly. But it is surely the outcome. Let's consider an example, and imagine that this MMP system had been in place in Canada's federal parliament back in the mid- to late-1950s. Under the MMP system on which you are being asked, as an Ontario voter, to pass judgment, the old Western Canada Concept would have had seats in the House of Commons in the 1980s, and the less-radical Reform Party would never have formed, much less attempt to be a national right-wing compromise such as the Canadian Alliance. And indeed, the Alliance would never have found a reason to compromise with the remnants of the Progressive Conservatives and become the Conservative Party of Canada, which now forms the government.
As well, Canada would still have the Social Credit Party, the Parti Creditiste, and perhaps even the elements of the old CCF that might not have wanted to become NDPers, if MMP were assumed to have started a half-century ago.
The existing "First-Past-The-Post" system (FPTP) rewards political parties for moving their policies and commitments toward the mainstream of Canadian society. When you form the government, you are expected to govern for everybody, and not for a niche demographic. Not so with MMP. The proposed system rewards political parties for a narrow rather than a broad focus.
Under MMP, interest groups can do the following calculation, and might arrive at the right numbers to earn a seat in the Ontario Legislature:
That is exactly what happened in New Zealand, touted as the poster child of MMP governments. It would be unreasonable not to expect parties based on religion; social causes; regional movements; and perhaps even civic parties and secessionist movements to contest for those 29 precious unelected seats in the Ontario Legislative Assembly. And once you let them in there, there is no way to get rid of them, because none of these MMP Members is accountable to any geographic constituency where people can vote them out. Amid the cacophony of special-or single-interest voices granted in the interests of perceived fairness, the business of Ontario will be drowned out or compromised away.
By most analysts' calculations, neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives could form a majority government under the MMP system proposed. Forget the balanced budget and the debt paydown that began in the 2003-07 term, unless there's a tradeoff with one of the splinter groups in the works. This brings the agenda of the few into the world of the mainstream. Blackmail is alive, well and becomes institutionalized under proportional representation.
In Ontario, Mike Harris showed that what was done by one majority government (Bob Rae's NDP) can be undone by another (Harris Tories). Similarly, Dalton McGuinty's government undid a ruinous corporate tax cut and a drift toward privatization that began under the Tories. Not under a minority MMP government. In the first-past-the-post system, a government can usually correct a mistake or take a bold initiative, whether right or wrong. In a proportional representation government, you have to live with, and perennially work around, your mistakes, patching them together with bricks cobbled from special interest demands, rather than an Ontario-wide agenda. Proportional representation is about perpetuation of the status-quo, not forward steps to the future.
The MMP proposal on October's ballot would add 29 seats to the Ontario Legislature, and allocate them to the parties based on their share of the popular vote. Now we have two classes of elected member. There are the spear-carriers who have to do the community work, build their organization, battle (or organize) the rent-a-mobs at the nomination meeting, and emerge battered and bloody to carry the party banner. After the election, the Party Leader congratulates them on their win, and consigns them to a commuter existence serving on committees, and acting as de-facto government program consultants in their ridings for 80 to 100 hours each week.
The other class of sitting member consists of the 'real power.' These are the people who, when approached to stand for public office, tell the Party Leader, "What! You think I'm going to put up with all that glad-handing, and fight one of those awful nomination battles? And if I don't win, I'm toast. Not on your life! If you want me in your caucus, or in Cabinet, I'll serve. Just bring me into the government from your proportional pool. That way, if your party loses the election, I can stay in my lucrative job, won't have to put my life on hold, and won't have to holler fruitlessly from the Opposition benches."
Proportional representation can't demand commitment from such fair-weather friends, even among the existing mainstream parties.
Do you think that the few, truly influential candidates would likely fight a riding battle, which they could (and often do) lose, or demand to come from the proportional pool? The proportional pool people are the future senior cabinet ministers and opposition front-benchers: unelected and unaccountable to any constituency. Worse yet, they are undefeatable. They can simply be re-allocated from the proportional pool.
Nice work when you can get it. And after every Ontaro election, if MMP passes in this referendum, 29 people will get it.
Simplicity at the expense of perfect fairness is the hallmark of the first-past-the-post system. It actually allows people to defeat their politicians. Never lose sight of this breathtaking benefit in our Canadian democracy.
To our U.S. cousins, who re-elect more than 90 percent of their politicians most years, the ability to make the type of sweeping change Canadians made nationally in 1993, or 1984, (or that Ontario made in 1987, 1990, 1995 and 2003) is a pipe dream. The simple, first-past-the-post system allows a somewhat level, and most importantly, a bare and exposed playing field. You can run from, or on, your record, but you can't hide.
More perceived fairness at the expense of complexity introduces thickets of subtleties and regulations behind which big and small parties can play politics at the expense of doing the people's business. It also allows them to blame the system for their own shortcomings. Surely the analysts and pundits are not under the impression that anybody will ever claim to truly like proportional representation governments.
The essence - and fundamental failing - of proportional representation is that if you pay more attention to the people and parties who lost the election, you will get better government.
Hogwash.
Let's let other countries play that game. We should reaffirm our first-past-the-post system with a solid "No" vote in the October 10 referendum. Ontario voters sometimes elect the wrong candidate for the wrong reason when a party wave is rolling. At least the government we do choose can get something done, and we can usually get rid of the rascals next time if they start doing any damage.
Date posted: Monday, May 21, 2007